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NO institution lias influenced human life more widely or more
deeply than the family. All the interests of man—social and
political, moral and religious
—
gather around the family home.
These interests, however, reach their highest emotional intensity
in that relation of the sexes, out of which the family takes its origin
;
and therefore the well-being" of mankind has always been intimately
liound up with the moral and religious usages, the social and civic
regulations by which this relation has been safeguarded. Accord-
ingly, in all the highest ci\ilisations the bond of man and wife has
been fortified by the most solemn motives that act upon the human
soul, the sanctities of a religious rite. Among- Christian communi-
ties at the present day the marriage ceremony is almost always per-
formed by a minister of religion, purely civil marriages are in gen-
eral regarded as "irregular," and they certainly form a very small
proportion of the matrimonial transactions. Christian sentiment on
the subject has taken its most definite form in the Roman Catholic
doctrine, which makes marriage one of the 'sacraments" of the
Church. The technical significance of this dogmatic theory or of
the controversies which it has originated does not concern us here
but even the most violent Protestant cannot shut his eyes to the fact,
that it gives the Roman Catholic Church a position of peculiar ad-
vantage in enforcing the inviolable sacredness of the marriage bond.
It has even been claimed at times, and by Catholics of philosophic
culture like Mr. W. S. Lilly, that "the only real witness in the world
for the absolute character of hoi}- matrimony is the Catholic
Church."''' This statement, though it might be qualified, is not here
"See an article by Mr. Lilly on " Marriage and Modern Civilisation " in Tlie
Nineteeytth Century for December, 1901, p 919.
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called in question. The benign influence of the Catholic Church as
a living witness for the sanctity of marriage is rather ungrudgingly
recognized. It is in fact for this reason that attention is here drawn
to the indications of a tendency which is calculated to mar the gen-
eral influence of the Church upon the institution of marriage.
This tendency has appeared in the Canadian Province of Que-
bec, where the Catholic Church holds a somewhat unique position.
That position has given her a peculiar power in controlling the mar-
riage-law of the whole Dominion. For, in the Act of Confederation
which forms the Constitution of Canada, her influence went with the
wisest convictions of Protestant statesmen towards keeping the
laws affecting marriage within the sphere of the Federal Govern-
ment. The Act, indeed, provides that each of the several Provinces
entering into confederation shall retain its existing laws till these
are amended by subsequent legislation. But four of the Provinces,
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and British
Columbia, had Divorce Courts at the time when they joined the
Dominion ; and as the Federal Parliament has in general avoided un-
necessary interference with Provincial freedom, those courts have
never been abolished. In the other Provinces, however, divorce is
still impossible by ordinary process of law ; it can be obtained only
by a special Act of Parliament, and only on proof of conjugal in-
fidelity.
But it is in the courts of the Province of Quebec rather than
in the Parliament of the Dominion, that the influence of the Catholic
Church on the marriage question has taken its most interesting
form. To understand this it is necessary to bear in mind that the
laws of France at the time of the cession of Canada remain the laws
of Quebec, except in so far as they have been modified by change of
sovereign or by subsequent legislation. Now, as a Catholic country
at the period in question, France governed her marriage-law by the
Catholic doctrine, as formulated by the Council of Trent. The
provincial law in Quebec has of course been amended to secure the
validity of marriage between persons who do not belong to the
Catholic Church ; and the whole marriage-law, as thus amended,
has been embodied in the Civil Code of the Province, which wa>
promulgated m 1867. So far as the marriage of non-Catholics is
concerned, the interpretation of the Code seems to have met with
no serious difficidty. But a perplexing legal problem has arisen
out of the fact, that occasionally persons belonging to the Catholic
Church have been married, not (as their Church requires) by one
of her own priests, but by a Protestant minister. According to
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many legal authorities, this fact does not invalidate the marriage of
Patholics before the civic law. as the Code seems to require merely
that a marriage must l)c celebrated before witnesses and by any
officer duly qualified ; l)ut Catholic jurists in general contend that,
in the case of Catholics, the marriage-ceremony must be performed
in a Catholic church and by a qualified Catholic priest. This point
involves merely a disputed interpretation of provincial law ; but the
problem is complicated by an additional contention of far more
serious import. For, as marriage is for Catholics a religious sac-
rament, some of the provincial judges have decided that, whenever
any question with regard to the validity of a marriage is brought
before the civil courts, they should refer it to the bishop of the dio-
cese and await his decision before pronouncing judgment in regard
to the civil effects of the marriage. This decision has very naturally
been opposed, not only by legal authorities, but by the unanimous
sentiment of the community outside of the Catholic Church. Un-
fortunately none of the cases that have come before the Canadian
courts have been appealed to the Privy Council in England, so that
no approach has yet been made towards an authoritative settlement
of the questions involved. The situation is therefore one that calls
for earnest reflection with the view of finding whether some solution
of the problem at issue may not be reached without regard to the
disputed interpretation of the law.
The whole problem has found its clearest expression in one of
the more recent cases, which, in virtue of its peculiar features, ex-
cited an unusual degree of interest throughout Canada. Other
cases of similar purport had been the subject of legal controversy
before, and at least one has been adjudicated since; but as the on.'
specially referred to is singularly free from side-issues in which the
main issue might be obscured, it may be taken as peculiarly repre-
sentative of the principle involved in them all. The facts of the
case are these : The petitioner was a }oung man named Edouard
Delpit, who had been baptised and brought up as a Catholic ; the
defendant, a young woman named Alarie Cote, likewise baptised
and brought up in the Catholic Church. In 1893, when the former
was twenty-three, and the latter only sixteen years of age, they
Vvere married by a Unitarian clergyman in Montreal in accordance
with all the forms required by law of the officiating minister. After
the two had lived together as man and wife for seven years, and
three children had been born to them, Delpit applied to the Arch-
bishop of Quebec to inquire into the validity of his marriage ; and
the Vicar General of the diocese, to whom the adjudication of mat-
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rimonial causes was delegated, pronounced the marriage null on the
ground of clandestinity. This decision was, on appeal, confirmed
in Rome ; and an application was then made to the civil court to con-
firm the judgment of the ecclesiastical court, and to annul the mar-
riage as to its civil efifects. The application was of course opposed,
and the case went to trial before Mr. Justice Archibald. He had
to face several decisions of the court, in which petitions similar in
purport to that of Delpit had been granted, and especially one of
great learning and argumentative ability, which had been rendered
some years before by Mr. Justice Jette. In dismissing the petition
Mr. Archibald's judgment became thus, almost of necessity, sub-
stantially if not formally, a review of the previous decisions, to
which it was opposed in principle. On the other hand, a decision
b} Mr. Justice Lemieux in a more recent case is substantially a re-
view of Mr. Archibald's judgment. The continuance of such a ju-
dicial debate is certainly undesirable ; but it is only fair to acknowl-
edge that the tone, in which it has been hitherto conducted, may
give some legitimate satisfaction to the Canadian people. It may be
questioned whether the judges of any other country could have
sustained such a debate with higher dignity or more perfect cour-
tesy. It may be added, that the learning and dialectical skill, dis-
played by advocates as well as judges, reflect the highest honor on
the Bar and the Bench of Quebec ; and if the question at issue is
ever carried to the Privy Council, the judges of that court will
probably find that the whole material has been thoroughly threshed,
and every particle of grain carefully sifted, bv their colonial con-
freres.
This is not the place, and it would be futile for a layman, to dis-
cuss the problem before the Canadian courts in its legal aspects.
But even if it were to receive final adjudication from the Supreme
Court of the Empire, that would settle merely the actual state of the
law, while the moral and religious interests involved would still
ofifer a serious problem, which might call for legislative action. It
is therefore worthy of consideration whether, even in the present
state of things, nothing can be done either to prevent such mar-
riages altogether or to prevent them from becoming subjects of con-
troversy in the civil courts or in the periodical press. Such a result
may be rendered far from impossible by a fair amount of judicious
action on both sides.
First of all, on the part of the Protestant people it is but an
obligation of justice to accord the fullest respect to those peculiarly
sacred sentiments, with which marriage as a religious sacrament
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is invested in the eyes of their CathoHc fellow-citizens. And it is
but fair to the Protestant people to acknowledge that this obligation
of justice is ungrudg-ingly recognized. There is therefore ground
for the hope that they will readily do their part to avoid any inter-
ference with the doctrine and practice of the Catholic Church in
regard to marriage. Now, it is not necessary to reflect, in the faint-
est manner, on the action of the Protestant clergy with regard to
Catholic marriages in the past. That may in all cases admit of
some reasonable explanation. But now the Protestant ministei
knows that, if he performs the ceremony of marriage between two
Catholics, his action may be declared null by the civil courts
after the injury resulting from it has become irre])arablc.
For this injury, 'tis true, he does not appear to be legally re-
sponsible. His sufficient w^arrant for performing the ceremony
is the license which the parties exhibit. But this is only a license
;
it only gives him liberty to perform the ceremony of marriage be-
tween the persons whom it names. Tt does not impose on him any
obligation to perform the ceremony if he has any scruples. On the
contrary, the Code takes care to provide that "none of the officers
authorised can be compelled to solemnise a marriage, to which an)'
impediment exists according to the doctrines and beliefs of his re-
ligion, and the discipline of the church to which he belongs." Il
is therefore perfectly competent for a Protestant clergyman, when
persons unknown to him apply for marriage, to inquire whether
they are Catholics ; and if they profess to be such, he is explicitly
authorised by law to refuse to perform the ceremony, for he can
plead as an insuperable impediment to their marriage those univer-
sal obligations of justice, which are the common doctrines of all
the churches. He may even dismiss their application as something
of a personal insult to himself. For, unless they are incredibly
ignorant, they must be aware that the ceremony, wdiich they ask
him to perform, cannot, in their faith, be a marriage at all ; that thev
expect him to sanction, by a solemn farce, their entering into a
relation with one another, which must, in their eyes, be profoundK'
immoral.*
*It is but fair to note that, that in the case of Dclpit and Cote, the defendant
in her demurrer denies that she and her husband were Catholics, and alleges "that
the petitioner professed to be non-Catholic while he was courting her-; that she, as
well as the circle of friends with whom he associated, had always considered him
as such ; that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the petitioner, pro-
fessing to be non-Catholic, requested that the ceremony should be performed by a
minister of the Unitarian Church, as being the church which came nearest to the
beliefs of the defendant ; thai she. on her part, was non-Catholic, Protestant, and
was recognised as such."
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While such an attitude would be reasonable on the part of the
Protestant clergy, it may fairly be expected that the Catholic
Church will do her part in overcoming the difficulties of the situa-
tion. And what is that part? In the first place, it is important that
the sentiment of Protestant society in regard to this matter should
not be misunderstood. That sentiment is in no sense anti-Catholic.
It is simply the sentiment of honorable men, whatever their reli-
gious faith may be,—the sentiment which forces them to act on the
homely principle, that their word is as good as their bond. This
sentiment expressed itself in clear and vigorous form with refer-
ence to the case of Delpit and Cote. And not unnaturally, in view
of the facts of the case. A young man. after some months' court-
ing, had persuaded a young girl—a very young girl, just entering
on her seventeenth summer—to plight to him her troth. They seek,
in a way prescribed by law, a license for their marriage. They ap-
pear before one of the officers whom the law authorises to perform
the ceremony, and are united in accordance with the usual formal-
ities. The husband enjoys the love of his wife for seven years,
and receives the dearest pledge of her love in three children who
call him their father. He does not complain of any failure of wifely
duty on her part. He never hints at the faintest disloyalty, even
in thought. He does not plead the most trivial excuse for seeking
to brand his wife and children with the stain of illegitimacy. He
merely contends, with a naivete which is astoundingly frank, that,
in spite of his monstrous disloyalty to the Catholic faith on the oc-
casion of his marriage, he must still be regarded as having been
a Catholic at the time ; and, as his marriage was undoubtedly null
before the law of the Catholic Church, he petitions to have it de-
clared null before the civil law of his country.
Is it wonderful that such a petition should have stirred a pain-
ful excitement in Canadian society? All gentlemen can surely un-
derstand the indignant scorn which the conduct of the petitioner has
awakened. The revulsion of feeling would not have been so deep
if he had frankly gone over to one of the neighbouring States, where
divorce is obtained on conveniently easy terms, and rid himself in
that way of the encumbrance of his wife. True, it is difficult to
conceive what plea could have been urged in his case to satisfy
even the most facile of divorce courts ; and a divorce, obtained in
that way, would not have allowed him to marry another woman
in Canada without risk of prosecution for bigamy. But a simple
divorce would at least have left wife and children free from any
social smirch, and would have avoided the painful shock of using
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a sacred doctrine and ritual to evade the honorable obligations of
a marriage-contract. For the facts cannot be ignored, that to the
ordinary lay mind, untrained in legal dialectic, it is merely tlu-
effect of the ecclesiastical judgment that is understood. And that
effect is seen to be practically the same as a divorce, with the aggra-
vation that the union is dissolved for a reason which no divorce-
court in the world would have entertained, that the woman, who
4iad believed herself to be an honorable wife, is reduced to the legal
status of a concubine, and that her children are subjected to the
consequent degradation. To all who have the faintest sympathy
with the testimony of the Catholic Church to the indissolubility of
the marriage-tie, it must surely be a matter of profound regret that
she should have lent her influence to assist any man in inflicting
such a cruel wrong on an innocent woman and on innocent chil-
dren by applying her doctrine to provide him with an eas\- method
of escaping from his marriage-contract.
The question is thus forced upon u.s, whether such tragedies
are really unavoidable,—whether they are really necessitated by
the claims of Catholic doctrine. The action of the Church in such
cases proceeds on the assumption, that, even if two Catholics defy
the doctrine of their faith by contracting marriage before an heret-
ical minister, they are still to be regarded as members of the Cath-
olic Church. Xow, such conduct may not be called an explicit re-
nunciation of Catholic faith, if explicitness is to be interpreted
only as implying expression in words. But it is a familiar common-
place, that a man may at times express what he means far more ex-
plicitly by action than by speech. "Majiis est coiisciitirc facto qiiaiv
Z'crbo." as St. Thomas puts it in reference to a cognate question.''
This is surely the case with Catholics who elect to be married be-
fore an heretical clergyman. Even if the\- do not verbally renounce
their faith, inasmuch as they seek to be married, and know that in
this way they cannot be married as Catholics, do they not declare,
in a manner more significant than any form of words, that the}
,vish to be considered Catholics no more? As a matter of fact, they
are subject to excommunication ; and the Archbishop of Montreal
has, in a recent pastoral, very properly reminded his people of their
danger in this respect. Is it too much to ask of the ecclesiastical
courts, that persons, who contract such marriages, shall be by their
very act excommunicated? Their marriage would then come under
* Summa Thcologica, Suppl., Quaestio 46, Art. 2.
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the laws applicable to non-Catholic marriages, and the problem be-
fore the civil courts of Canada would be solved.*
By such an attitude the Catholic Church has nothing to lose,
but rather everything to gain. It is not of course implied that per-
sons married in this Avay would be permanently cut off from the
communion of the Church. On the contrary, their reconciliation
with the Church would be greatly facilitated by her adoption of
the attitude suggested. For obviously a serious and unnecessary
obstacle is placed in the way of returning penitents when it is made
a condition of their return, that their marriage and its fruits shall
be degraded by the social stigma of illegitimacy. Nor does this at-
titude involve any strained dialectic, from which an honourable
mind need shrink in its interpretation of law. The dialectic is rather
of a kind which an honourable interpretation of law has always en-
forced. For it has been recognized from of old that, owing to the
imperfection of human foresight and human language, it is impos-
sible to provide by legislative enactment for all the complications
of right and wrong, that may arise out of the social relations of
men. It is therefore a commonplace of general experience, as well
as of scientific jurisprudence, that laws must be interpreted in the
spirit rather than in the mere letter of their requirements,—inter-
preted in the light of the universal principles of justice which they
embody rather in the light of any grammatical meaning which
may be wrung out of their language, or forced into it, by an in-
genious philology. The opposing pleas in any court of justice in-
dicate the conflicting interpretations of law, to which men are led
* la this article, as already stated, the legal aspects of the question at issue are
avoided. But it is not out of place to note, that, while the Catholic Church may
formulate the conditions of communion with her, which carry the right to her spi-
ritual blessings, the State has also a right to formulate the conditions under which
a man may claim or forfeit the benefits of such communion in its civil effects. This
point does not appear to have come up for specific discussion in any of the cases
under consideration here. It is, however, incidentally referred to in the judgment
of Mr. Justice Archibald. After proving by a great array of authorities, that in
law the presumption in favor of the validity of a marriage is far stronger than that
in favor of other facts, and can be negatived only by disproving every other possi-
bility, be goes on to observe that, ''if Catholics could not be married before a
Protestant minister, their seeking marriage before such minister would be pre-
sumed to be a renunciation of the Catholic faith " I venture to suggest that a
celebrated case in Canadian law has already claimed for the civil courts a right to
decide whether a person is or is not, for civil purposes, a member of the Catholic
Church, A French-Canadian Catholic, named Guibord, a member of the /nsf/'tut
C anadtoi, died while that institute was under excommunication. On appeal the
Privy Council decided that excommunication, directed against a corporate body,
did not affect its individual members, who must be named individually in the ex-
communication to give it any effect upon them. Accordingly Guibord was pro-
nounced to have been in law still a member of the Catholic Church, and entitled
to the civil rights flowing from such membership. By parity of reasoning the
Court might decide when a man is not a Catholic for civil purposes.
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when they start from different points of view ; and the pleadings
and judgments in the causes to which this article refers form a
singularly interesting illustration of legal dialectic moving within
irreconcilable spheres of jural thought, and forced by logical neces-
sity to irreconcilable conclusions.
Now, the Catholic doctrine of marriage itself furnishes the
data, by which an honorable interpretation might prevent such cases
-as that of Delpit and Cote from ever disturbing a civil court. For,
as has just been pointed out, Catholics, who contract marriage in
the way supposed, practically renounce their faith by perpetrating
a sin which, they know, renders them liable to excommunication.
Their marriage may, therefore, fairly be dealt with by the canons
which relate to non-Catholic marriages. But it must be borne in
mind that the requirement, which makes the ])rescncc of a Cath-
olic priest indispensable to a valid marriage, is a qualification of
Catholic doctrine, introduced by the Council of Trent. Moreover,
this is a condition of valid marriage only for Catholics, and even
for Catholics only in those countries where the decrees of the coun-
cil have been officially promulgated. For the marriage of non-
Catholics, or of Catholics not bound by Tridcntine law. the old doc-
trine of the Catholic Church remains the norm. But in that doc-
trine the constituent factor of a marriage is the mutual consent of
the contracting parties. Even yet the teaching of the Catholic
Church continues, naturally and properly, to be dominated by this
conception of the spiritual substance of the marriage-bond. Thus
Mr. Lilly takes occasion twice* in tlie course of his article alread\
mentioned, to observe, that the essence of marriage is the free con-
sent of the man and woman contracting. Tn the admirable hand-
book—the Sum Ilia Philosol^hicaf of Cardinal Zigliara. which is
extensively used in the colleges of Quebec, the doctrine, that
"iinttinis lOiisciisiis fo///;/;'///// est causa cfflciciis niatriiiionii. ' is
expounded as if it still embodied the substance of Catholic teaching.
In his preface the Cardinal professes to follow in the footsteps
of St. Thomas, ackntnvledging himself to be "Angelici Doctoris
doctrinis addictissimus ;" and certainly in all literature it would be
difficult to find a more spiritual conception of the marriage-bond
than that which runs through the teaching of the great mediaeval
thinker. For him everything is subordinated to the spiritual fact
of the mutual internal consent of the contracting persons, expressed
* Xi>uicc>U/t Cculury, Dec. 1901, p. 909 and p. 912, note,
f Vol. III., pp. 196-S.
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by some unmistakable external sign. Thus, on the ground of the
phrase quoted above, that consent may be expressed by deed more
decisively than by word, he held that a mere betrothal, that is, an
expression only of future consent, if followed by cohabitation,
though without any verbal expression of present consent, consti
tutes marriage in its spiritual essence. It is not difficult, therefore,
to conceive what St. Thomas would have thought of the ecclesiasti-
cal decisions which have attracted attention in the Province of Que-
bec. That two persons, who have declared their consent to be man
and wife, who have done so in presence of capable witnesses,
whose mutual consent has been officially recorded in a public reg-
ister kept for the purpose in accordance with the laws of their
countr}-, who have lived together, in good faith, as man and wife
for years, and given birth to several children, should yet be pro-
nounced to have been never married at all, and so pronounced, not
by a civil court on the ground of some technical defect in external
forms, but by the Church which is expected to look beyond external
forms to the spiritual intent of actions,—such a decision, it is not
too much to say, would have shocked the great master of Catholic
thought as eliminating the spiritual kernel of the Catholic doctrine
of marriage, and making the efficacy of a holy sacrament depend on
a comparatively trivial detail in its ceremony.*
But even if the doctrine of the Catholic Church does not admit
of an interpretation which would leave the marriages in question
intact, it is still difficult to understand how her discipline could ever
allow her courts to render such a vercUct as that in the case of
Dclpif and Cote. For that verdict is not merely a formal judgment
pronouncing the supposed marriage to be null, but it carries with
it a certificate of liberty to the two parties, declaring "that they are
freed from all matrimonial ties whatever, and that they mav, if
they think proper, marry again." This may appear at first to be
simply a logical issue of the judgment annulling the marriage.
But it is not. For the judgment is not that of a civij court, treat-
ing the two parties purely as citizens who had made a civil contract
with one another, and not at all as members of any particular
church. If the contract had been declared invalid on the ground
* It is not necessary here to dwell upon the fact, which still ought not to be
overlooked in this connection, that church courts are not any more than civil courts
exempt from the common frailties of humanity. But it may be observed that Mr.
Lilly, in those scholarly studies which he has given us in his A'e//aissa?ice 7\pcs
has described with historical impartiality the notorious condition of the Roman
Curia at the period to which he refers. See pp. 208, 283-4 '< 3-°^ compare pp. 54
55. Similar language is used in his llif Claims of Christianity, p. 140.
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of some impediment insuperable in natural or civil law, that would
have been an end of it; the contractino- jxirties would have been
freed from all the legal ol)ligations of the contract, or rather it
would have appeared that there had not been, in fact, any legal con-
tract at all. T'.ut it is very different witli the case, to which this
judgment refers. The judgment is based on the assumption that
the contracting parties were Catholics, and it falls to the ground
whenever that assumption is invalidated. The petitioner therefore
cannot pose as a Catholic in order to claim freedom from the mat-
rimonial tie, and at the same time renounce the Catholic commu-
nion because it interferes with that freedom. I kit such interfer-
ence is precisely what Catholic discipline enforces. Whatever
judgment may be necessitated by Catholic doctrine in regard to the
petitioner's marriage, the discipline of the Church is inexorable in
refusing just such a freedom as is granted in his certificate of
liberty. For the ceremony, in which the petitioner took part, was
undoubtedly a contract at least. It is in fact spoken of as a con-
tract of marriage ; for Catholic doctrine distinguishes, in the ab-
stract at least, between the contract of marriage and the marriage
itself.* But, in whatever terms the contract be described, it is a
contract ; and no power in the universe can annul the fact, that the
petitioner did make such a contract. A court may, by the logic of
its laws, be forced to decide that the contract in itself was not a
marriage; but it cannot make the contract to be not a contract.
Now, the discipline of the Catholic Church, as (it may be presumed)
of all churches, requires that her members shall fulfill their con-
tracts, unless they are released from the obligation in an honour-
able way. But the petitioner in this case makes no pretense of hav-
ing been released, it is inconceivable in fact that he could be hon-
ourably released, from the obligation of his contract. The disci-
pline of his Church, therefore, cannot allow his liberty to marry
again. It demands rather that, if he is to be considered a Catholic,
and to plead before her courts as such, he must do his duty as a
Catholic by fulfilling a contract which he has solemnly made, and
which he cannot set aside without inflicting an appalling wrong on
his innocent consort and children.
The truth is, that, in claiming to be a Catholic at the time of
his marriage, the petitioner knows that he has already done such
a wrong. And here again the requirements of Catholic discipline
*This distinction is referred to repeatedly in the pleadings and judgments of
the Canadian courts. Its real purport is explained, with singular clearness, by
Cardinal Zigliara in Sumtna Philosof'hica, Vol. III., p. 209.
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are perfectly explicit. The sin of a clandestine marriage, as al-
ready stated, exposes the guilty parties to excommunication ; and
they can retain, or recover, their position in the Church only by
solemn absolution from their sin. It is worth observing that, in
one of his pastorals on the subject, the Archbishop of Montreal
warns his people, that he reserves to himself the power of absolu-
tion in such cases. But the discipline of the Catholic Church is
strangely misunderstood, if it does not require from every wrong-
doer the fullest possible reparation of the wrong he has done as an
indispensable preliminary to absolution. To my mind, as already
explained, the only adequate reparation, which the Church can en-
force in the case supposed, is to treat the marriage as that of per-
sons who had cut themselves off from her communion, and to re-
store them, on proof of penitence, by the disciplinary procedure
which is applicable to persons excommunicated. But if such a
complete reparation cannot be enjoined by the Church, her disci-
pline itself stands in the way of a judgment which leaves the wrong-
doer free to make his wrong utterly irremediable by contracting
another marriage. Instead of such a certificate of liberty her dis-
cipline demands that the wrong-doer shall repair the wrong he has
done by celebrating in valid canonical form the marriage which he
had contracted irregularly. By enforcing her discipline in this di-
rection the Church would have avoided the appearance, which she
has created, undoubtedly in the outside world, if not among her own
people, of having for the moment forgotten her sacred mission in
regard to family-life, and inadvertently lent herself as an instru-
ment to those who are endeavoring to relax the marriage-bond.
